



Lonely At The Top? CEO Sensemaking In The Boardroom 
Athanasopoulou, A., Smets, M., Risi, D. & Morris, T. 
(January 2020 version) 
ABSTRACT 
Amidst the uncertainty and ambiguity characterizing CEO’s role, issues or events that are 
“novel, ambiguous, confusing, or in some other way violate expectations” (Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014: 57) mobilize CEOs to seek information and to challenge their - and others’ 
- understanding. Drawing on in-depth qualitative interviews with 146 global CEOs, we conduct 
a micro-level analysis of how CEOs seek, process and make sense of information via their 
interactions with the TMT and others as part of their decision-making process. We explore the 
interchangeable and power-charged process of sensedemanding and sensemaking through 
which meaning-making and eventually decision-making occur. The process involves CEOs 
(nominally) conceding some of their power and voice to others, before retaining them prior to 
making a decision. CEOs invite dissension and hence, also invite multivocality (and as a result 
also equivocality) from their environment and seek to test or validate sensemaking and 
crystalize it into decisions. Our findings unpack the micro-dynamics of CEO decision-making 
drawing on the CEO-TMT interface, managerial cognition and decision-making literatures.  
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Decision makers operate in turbulent, complex and ambiguous organizational contexts, but are 
“boundedly rational” (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992: 17). Their choices are “ultimately 
political”, enhancing their power by engaging in political tactics (including the use of 
information) (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992: 27). In our study we focus on those charged with 
making organizations’ thorniest decisions - CEOs. There is very limited research into the co-
creation of sensemaking at the C-suite level and particularly the interactions between the CEO 
and others, such as the TMT (Bromiley & Rau, 2016).  
This dearth of research on the cognitive influences at the CEO-TMT level and on the links 
between power and sensemaking (Balogun et al., 2014; Brown et al., 2015) provide a strong 
motivation to unpack CEO sensemaking in interaction with their TMT. The competition among 
multiple accounts of sensemakers and the associated effects and tradeoffs relating to 
equivocality produced by the interaction of different sensemakers have also been signposted by 
Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010: 571-572) as areas warranting further investigation. In 
environments where research access is limited due to elite status, such as the C-suite, such an 
exploration is rare, yet potentially very insightful due to the sensemaking dynamics involved.  
To address this gap, we draw on a unique dataset of in-depth qualitative interviews with 146 
CEOs, aiming to understand how CEOs source information, interact with their environment 
(TMT and others) and make sense of the organizational reality to make more informed 
decisions. For our study we draw on the CEO-TMT interface, managerial cognition and 
decision-making literatures (e.g. Bromiley & Rau, 2016; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; Arendt, 
Priem, & Ndofor, 2005; van Knippenberg et al., 2015). Throughout our findings a common 
thread is oscillation manifested in three dimensions:  a. interaction dynamics between the CEO 
and others; b. between rational and intuitive decision-making and c. between different types of 




First, we uncover the dynamics of CEO-TMT/others interaction, manifesting itself as a pendular 
exchange of power and voice between the CEO and others. Secondly, we unpack the dynamic 
interplay of rationality and intuition in CEO decision-making in complex situations, which 
proves to be a much less linear process than typically implied in the literature. Thirdly, we 
explore the underlying mechanisms of collective meaning making inside organizations which 
are based on continuously negotiated relations of power manifested through the management 
of multivocality and equivocality by the CEO. We propose a model that simultaneously 
captures the individual and the social dimension of sensemaking and calls for engagement in 
four different types of ‘sense’ processes: sensemaking, sensegiving, sensebreaking and 
sensehiding. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In the following, we first present research on the CEO-TMT interface, second discuss 
scholarship on how this interface influences CEO decision making, and thirdly elaborate on 
sensemaking research and discuss the dynamics of sensemaking. 
CEOs and the Top Management Team (TMT) Interface  
The literature has traditionally consolidated CEOs and other TMT members into a single 
category, obscuring any potential dynamics between the two (Peterson, Martorana, Smith & 
Owens, 2003). Accordingly, we lack research on cognitive influences at the CEO-TMT 
interface (Bromiley & Rau, 2016) and CEO cognition more broadly. As such the CEO-TMT 
interface literature tends to focus on two key themes. The first studies how CEO personality 
affects TMT group dynamics and the links between CEO personality and firm outcomes. The 
second is around the “psychological safety” that the CEO creates to allow open interactions and 
facilitate decision-making. We will go into these two aspects in more detail below. 
The impact of CEOs on how TMT behaves. As far as CEO personality and its impact on TMT 
group dynamics go, much of the research has studied the role of CEOs with a transformational 




performance (e.g. Ou et al., 2014; Ling, Simsek, Lubatkin & Veiga, 2008; Peterson, Martorana, 
Smith & Owens, 2003). Overall, elite teams with a leader who is open to the influence of others 
tend to perform better (Peterson, 1997). CEOs who are more open to new experiences are 
regarded as strong leaders (Peterson et al., 2003). Also, CEOs who project humility are able to 
better connect with their TMT by creating collective or shared perceptions of empowerment at 
both levels (i.e. enhancing the meaningfulness of work, fostering participation in decisions, 
expressing confidence in high performance and providing autonomy) (Ou et al., 2014). The 
emphasis of such CEOs is on contributing to TMT integration; members collaborating, sharing 
information and making joint decisions. They share a common vision which consequently has 
collective positive effects at lower levels of the organization. Such CEO openness is found to 
be significantly related TMT risk-taking and intellectual flexibility (Peterson et al., 2003). 
Individuals that are open to new experiences tend to value intellectual matters, be interested in 
unusual thought processes, and are seen as thoughtful and creative (McCrae & Costa, 1997).  
The impact of CEOs on how TMT thinks. CEOs influence not only how the TMT behaves but 
also how it thinks. Team performance is influenced by the existence or lack of “psychological 
safety”, defined as “a shared belief held by members of a team that the team is safe for 
interpersonal risk taking” (Edmondson, 1999: 350). Psychological safety is, for instance, team 
members’ feeling that they will not be rejected for making a mistake and that there is openness 
within the team to discuss one’s own mistakes and those of others. Within a CEO-TMT 
interaction context, one could say that the psychological safety concept manifests itself in the 
circumstance that team members feel safe to speak up when they do not agree with their leader, 
without feeling that they take a risk. Moreover, and related to this, Edmondson (1999) found 
that psychological safety is clearly associated with learning behavior, contributing to collective 
learning processes. Edmondson (1999) found that the psychological safety provided to a team 
plays a critical role in the successful operation of a team. Overall, team psychological safety 




Hence, context support and team leader coaching, along with shared beliefs, influence team 
outcomes, specifically with regards to team learning behavior and team performance. 
The flipside of a context that nurtures ‘psychological safety’ is one where CEO’s leadership 
stifles independent thinking. This is often met in the literature in studies looking into the impact 
of CEO narcissism on their behavior and interactions with the TMT (Gerstner, König, Enders 
& Hambrick 2013; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017). Drawing on 
different rewards, punishments, and influence tactics, such CEOs leave little space for openness 
and independent decision-making and control interactions with – and within – the TMT. 
According to Peterson (1997), early research on leadership style suggested that directive leaders 
tend to be the main reason for defective processes and poor outcomes in group decision making. 
Yet, the way this directiveness is managed seems to have a significant effect as to whether 
directiveness brings positive outcomes or not (e.g. the quality of relationships between 
members, how good use is made of information, how good are the produced solutions). Peterson 
(1997: 1107) found that the type of directiveness determined the effects. Specifically, process 
directiveness, i.e. the extent to which “a leader regulates the process by which the group reaches 
a decision”, was seen as a strong predictor of quality of group process and outcomes. 
Conversely, outcome directiveness, i.e. the extent to which “a leader advocates a favored 
solution”, was associated with a much smaller and less coherent range of group outcomes.  
CEO Decision-Making  
In recent years there has been growing interest in research at the intersection of decision-
making, leadership and information processing (e.g. van Knippenberg et al., 2015; Joseph & 
Gaba, in press). There are two distinct types of information-processing systems in human 
beings (Dane & Pratt, 2007: 35-36): a. “the automatic and relatively effortless processing and 
learning of information” (described as “experiential” or “tacit”) and b. individuals’ learning of 
information which is deliberate, meant to develop ideas and engage in analyses in an “attentive 




making. Information is conveyed in different ways within organizations. For instance, Patriotta 
(2003: 373) found that organizational routines are replaced by narratives as “the main carriers 
of organizational (tacit) knowledge”. As CEOs seek to make sense of their environment, 
process information and make more informed decisions, one can identify different patterns of 
interactions with their context and CEOs’ attention channeled in certain directions accordingly 
with effects on their decision-making.  
Context and CEO decision-making. The context within which the CEO-TMT interface takes 
place also shapes the kind of decisions drawn. For instance, there is a distinct stream of research 
looking into the relationship between organizational structure, individual cognition, and 
decision making based on the notion “that organizational structure creates differentiated 
contexts that lead to distinct responses to environmental information” (for a review see Joseph 
& Gaba, in press: 33). According to Ma, Kor & Seidl (2019) the context of CEO advice seeking 
consists of the strategic context, the governance context and the CEO’s personal context. All 
three interplay and shape the source, type, and nature of advice CEOs seek. For example, 
Gerstner, König, Enders and Hambrick (2013: 257) found that when there is high audience 
engagement in an environment in which a CEO operates, the CEO is more likely to make more 
aggressive strategic decisions. One other aspect of context and how it shapes CEOs’ decision-
making is time and timing of decision. Jianhong and Nadkarni (2017) found time and timing of 
decision-making to be critical. They identified two distinct CEO temporal dispositions, namely 
time urgency (i.e. “the feeling of being chronically hurried”) and pacing style (i.e. “one’s pattern 
of effort over time in working toward deadlines”), which have an impact on CEOs’ temporal 
leadership behaviors and eventually on their strategic behavior (ibid: 31). Jianhong and 
Nadkarni (2017) observe that CEOs’ temporal leadership behaviors are context specific 
meaning that the type of industry they operate in will influence the timing of a decision. 
Nadkarni and Chen (2014: 1810) also explore CEOs’ temporal focus, meaning the extent to 




They found that the type of environment CEOs operate in interacts with the type of focus they 
have and determines the speed by which new products are introduced. 
CEO attention and advice seeking. Attention is a recurring theme in the CEO-TMT and 
decision-making literature with studies looking into CEOs’ attention to certain issues and how 
their attention is shaped from their interactions with the TMT (Yadav, Prabhu & Chandy, 2007; 
Ma, Kor and Seidl, 2019). According to Ma et al. (2019), the attention-based view is one of 
three promising theoretical perspectives (the others being neo-institutionalist theory and 
practice theory), which are key to upper echelons research, but have been underutilized in the 
CEO advice-seeking literature. This is because advice seeking can influence the kind of issues  
a CEO pays attention to and engages with, the CEO’s attention structure influences the potential 
sources of advice that a CEO will engage with (e.g. focusing on particular advisers and not 
others) and how CEOs tend to deal with the advice they receive. The attention-based view posits 
that the way in which a firm channels and distributes the attention of its decision-makers 
determines the behavior of the firm (Ocasio, 1997). Specifically, decision-makers’ actions are 
shaped by the type of issues and answers they are focusing their attention on which depend on 
the situations at hand and how the company has organized its communication and procedures 
around issues, answers and decision-makers. Yadav, Prabhu and Chandy (2007) found that 
CEOs’ attention is a critical driver to innovation and that CEOs have over time a positive, direct 
and long-term impact on firms’ detection, development and deployment of new technologies. 
A leader’s attention to the way in which decisions are made by elite teams instead of the 
decision itself will lead to more leader support and group confidence as well as higher quality 
group decision processes, which eventually result in better decision-making (Peterson, 1997). 
CEOs’ attention is focused not only on the issues at hand that require a decision but also on 
whom (or with the support of whom) they make a decision. CEOs select adviser/collaborators 
who are similar to them in terms of attitudes, values and demographic characteristics (Mooney 




such advisers serve as “a sounding board for the CEO’s ideas” (Eisenhardt, 1989a: 559). Other 
times, the CEO ignores advice, arguably as power makes them more self-focused and, thus, 
more likely to act upon their preferences (Pitesa & Thau, 2013).   
Arendt, Priem and Nodfor (2005) introduced the CEO-Adviser model as an intermediate model 
of strategic decision making. Arendt et al. (2005) suggest that there are three models of CEO 
involvement in the strategic decision-making process. The first is CEO model where the CEO 
is the strategic decision maker, gathering information from surrounding managers, but then 
processing the information, developing a strategy and directing its implementation on their own. 
The second is the CEO-Adviser model whereby the CEO is the principal decision maker, but 
draws on the support of both internal and external advisers with whom there is dyadic 
communication between the CEO and advisers. According to this model, the CEO selects 
advisers and it is characterized by a consultative decision-making style in that the CEO listens 
to the adviser’s ideas but then makes decisions alone, having the ultimate discretion on the final 
decision and being accountable to it. Finally, the TMT model suggests that the company’s top 
management is the strategic decision maker, with TMT members bringing critical information 
to the group, jointly generating and assessing alternatives, settling disagreements to reach a 
common decision and together participating in strategy implementation. Arendt et al. (2005) 
propose the CEO-Adviser model as an as an intermediate model of strategic decision making 
which depends on environmental dynamism, the organizational strategy employed, CEO’s 
leadership style and CEO tenure and the adviser selection. So, the role of context is critical.  
According to research on CEO behavior and interactions, CEOs do not rely just on their TMT 
to make more informed decisions, but also may draw on support from others based on their 
needs. According to Ma & Seidl (2018), new CEOs have two types of needs guiding them in 
the configuration of their team of immediate collaborators: a. strategic orientation needs that 
involve the need to find collaborators who possess the required competences and commitment 




personal integration needs that involve finding collaborators who can provide access to key 
information, allowing the CEO to test ideas and satisfying the CEO’s need for personal fit. Ma 
and Seidl’s (2018) observation is in line with earlier research by Roberto (2003) who found that 
different groups, with members coming from various organizational levels, are formed with a 
view to make various strategic decisions and a subset of the TMT forms the core of a decision-
making body involved in strategizing. They suggest that the composition of this constellation 
tends to differ from that of the TMT in the sense that it sometimes comprises of a subgroup of 
the TMT and in others, it includes individuals outside the TMT such as staff members or lower-
level managers. The management of such constellations requires considerable fine-tuning based 
on trial and error. Any discrepancies between the strategic leadership constellation and the TMT 
cause tensions which trigger a convergence process between the two groups, particularly as the 
CEO’s needs evolve and as the constraints on the CEO to change the TMT also evolve over 
time (Ma & Seidl, 2018). Such observations echo Ocasio, Pozner & Milner (2019) who argue 
that political capital utilization within an organization extends beyond the upper echelons. 
Ocasio et al. (2019: 4) define political capital as “the variety of economic, social, and cultural 
resources available to individuals and groups to affect organizational decisions, actions, and 
outcomes”. Organizational members from different levels and with different formal positions 
can affect the organizational strategy. So, the CEO-TMT interaction is as critical in how 
decisions are managed as is how the parties involved make sense of decisions to enact them. 
Making Sense of Sensemaking?  
Scholars do not agree on a single definition of sensemaking (Brown et al., 2015: 266), but they 
do concede that it is a systemic (Weick et al., 2005: 412), social process (Maitlis & Christianson, 
2014: 66), “through which people work to understand issues or events that are novel, 
ambiguous, confusing, or in some other way violate expectations” (Maitlis & Christianson, 
2014: 57). This is triggered once discrepancies occur between expectations and reality (Maitlis 




disrupting their understanding of the world and creating uncertainty about how to act” (Maitlis 
& Christianson, 2014: 70).  The “reciprocal influence between action and the environment 
during sensemaking is known as enactment” (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014: 84). According to 
Weick (1979: 165) sensemaking “is thought to involve activities of negotiations between people 
as to what is out there. Less prominent in these analyses is the idea that people, often alone, 
actively put things out there that they then perceive and negotiate about perceiving. It is this 
initial implanting of reality that is preserved by the word enactment.” 
The sensemaking perspective is made up of five main constituents (see Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2015: 26). It is confined to specific episodes (i.e. organizational activities interrupted until they 
are satisfactorily restored), it is triggered by ambiguous events  (which can be major or minor 
planned/unplanned events), it occurs through specific processes (that is, creation, interpretation, 
and enactment), generates specific outcomes  (i.e. a specific sense on which actors act) and is 
influenced by several situational factors  (i.e. contexts, cognitive frames, language, identity, 
politics, emotion, and technology) (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015: 26). The proliferation of 
research on sensemaking has produced new typologies such as first- and second-order 
sensemaking, which distinguishes between meaning creation during disruptive events and the 
discourses and narratives employed to make sense of the sensemaking of organizational 
members (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015; Brown, 2000).  
The social dynamics of sensemaking. A substantial stream of research at the intersection of 
decision-making and information-processing focuses on information attention patterns. Joseph 
& Gaba (in press) note the situated nature of cognition and decision-making within 
organizations, stressing the role of interactions rather than individual sensemaking and the 
implications this has for organizational behavior. For instance, the authors argue that 
interactions which are situated and embedded help explain the link between organizational 
structure and conflict in decision-making. According to Joseph & Gaba (in press) two possible 




accessibility or limits of activation of frames, categories, and vocabularies that trigger 
sensemaking or b. differences in attention, based on the assumption that decision makers could 
cope with multiple goals in different ways. CEOs’ primary role when initiating strategic change 
can be best understood in terms of sensemaking but also sensegiving (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991). Sensemaking “is both an effect, and productive, of what are continuously negotiated 
relations of power” (Brown et al., 2015: 269) involving a complicated interplay of other sense- 
processes such as sensebreaking, sensedemanding and sensehiding (Maitlis & Christianson, 
2014). On the other hand, sensegiving is “the process of attempting to influence the 
sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of 
organizational reality” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991: 442). This is facilitated by leaders’ 
discursive ability and process facilitators (routines, practices, and structures) (Maitlis & 
Lawrence, 2007: 57). Sensemaking is retrospective while sensegiving is prospective (Sandberg 
& Tsoukas, 2015). Critical to the latter are interpersonal, face-to-face conversations as the key 
to organizational knowing (Mengis & Eppler, 2008) and decision-making (Gunia et al., 2012). 
Sensebreaking is “the destruction or breaking down of meaning” (Pratt, 2000: 464) and 
precedes sensegiving. It disrupts previous assumptions and prompts sensemaking (Bishop, 
Trevino, Gioia & Kreiner, in press). Acts of sensebreaking include offering contradictory 
evidence, giving very negative evaluations, providing the overall picture, presenting alternative 
views and questioning assumptions (Vlaar et al., 2008: 229). Via sensebreaking, previously 
held conceptions are reframed and other team members’ attention is redirected and solutions 
sought (ibid: 241). According to Bishop et al. (in press), if an emotional sensebreaking event 
generates a meaning void, alternative narratives to aid sensemaking and sensegiving are sought 
out. This calls for sensedemanding which is the process by which individuals “seek to 
ameliorate the quality of the information upon which they base their decisions”, undertaking 
strenuous efforts to acquire and process information to establish “a workable level of 




individuals employ sensehiding whereby “the discourse can be mobilizing in terms of 
promoting a specific kind of thinking and action or manipulative in terms of hiding particular 
ideas” and, being inherently political, it serves the purpose of discursive legitimation (Vaara  & 
Monin, 2010: 6). According to Vlaar et al. (2008) sensegiving, sensedemanding, and 
sensebreaking are particularly critical in helping geographically dispersed collaborators to find 
shared, common, or mutual understandings. These processes are also pertinent to CEO’s 
interaction with multiple stakeholders as part of their day-to-day process of decision-making. 
Sensemaking, rationality and intuition. A critical aspect on CEO’s interaction with the TMT 
or other advisers in day-to-day decision-making is how any emerging information is made sense 
of. As noted earlier, at the heart of sensemaking is a distinction on how information is processed 
by individuals during decision-making. With CEOs engaging under pressure with a multiplicity 
of complex decisions at hand, a study of such processes is critical. Bromiley & Rau (2016: 196) 
conclude that there is much scope in studying cognitive influences on CEOs and TMTs as well 
as the links between CEO power and CEO-TMT interactions, their information-processing and 
CEO tendencies for intuitive or analytical decision-making (Bromiley & Rau, 2016: 196).  
In the last two decades we see increasing calls for a shift from rationalist to intuitive models in 
decision-making recognizing the often unconscious processes that have a definitive impact on 
how CEOs make sense of the world around them and guide their decisions (e.g. Haidt, 2001; 
Sonenshein, 2007; Sadler-Smith, 2016). Elbanna & Child (2007) identify rationality, intuition, 
and political behavior as three key strategic decision-making process dimensions. Haidt (2001) 
expresses his doubt on the causal importance of reason, essentially finding the rationalist 
approach to be flawed in that most of the cognition happens automatically and beyond 
consciousness. It happens thanks to intuition defined as “a form of information processing that 
differs from rational, or analytical, processes” (Dane & Pratt, 2007: 35). As such, there is a 
growing stream of research now examining intuition in decision-making (e.g. Salas et al. 2010; 




the rationalist approach. Among other things, the rationalist approach has failed to address 
equivocality (i.e. the existence of several simultaneous interpretations and the associated 
sensemaking ambiguity) and uncertainty which are bound to exist (Sonenshein, 2007). 
Similarly, Haidt (2001) differentiated between the contrast of intuition and reasoning and the 
contrast of emotion and cognition. In line with Weick (1979), Sonenshein (2007: 1022) 
proposed a sensemaking-intuition model on the basis that “individuals engage in sensemaking 
under conditions of equivocality and uncertainty”. Reflecting on this theoretical backdrop, our 
study seeks to answer the following critical research question: How do CEOs’ interactions with 
others influence CEOs’ sensemaking when making C-suite decisions? 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This study is part of a larger research project that examines the question of how CEOs develop 
the competence to lead in a changing world. Due to our interest in CEOs’ sensemaking and 
decision-making, adopting a qualitative methodology is a logical choice as it helps us 
understand the world “from the perspective of those studied (i.e., informants)” (Pratt, 2009: 
856). Our research grounds on the interpretivist tradition suggesting that “the social world is 
already interpreted before the social scientist arrives” (Blaikie, 2000: 36). The scientist’s task, 
therefore, is to interpret the interpretations of the study’s participants, relying “as much as 
possible on the participants’ view of the situation being studied” (Creswell, 2003: 8). 
Research Context and Sampling Strategy 
It is notoriously difficult to gain access to elite managers, particularly those in top management 
positions (Thomas, 1993; Kakabadse et al., 2015). The total number of interviews obtained for 
this research is unusually large for qualitative studies of CEOs. To achieve this unprecedented 
scale, the authors drew on the joint resources of a globally leading business school specialized 
in leadership education and Heidrick and Struggles, one of the world’s largest executive search 




We gained direct access to 146 CEOs with an average tenure of 6.5 years, responsibility for 
46,000 and revenues in excess of USD$14 billion. The sample covers a cross-section of regions 
including Africa, Asia Pacific, Latin America, Europe, the Middle East/North Africa, and North 
America, as well as sectors, including consumer goods, finance, industry, life sciences, 
professional services, and technology companies. Women CEOs made up 8% of the sample.  
Data Collection 
We approached that examination qualitatively, conducting rich, personal conversations with 
152 CEOs representing a wide range of sectors around the world, generating unique and 
detailed insights into how global CEOs lead. These in-depth, semi-structured interviews were, 
with few exceptions, conducted face-to-face. All interviews were transcribed verbatim and 
anonymized prior to analysis. Assured of their anonymity, the CEOs reflected candidly on their 
experience of leadership. Open-ended questions allowed them free rein to elaborate and gave 
us a glimpse of today’s business world through the eyes of its most senior leaders.  
In interviews having an average length of 55 minutes, we asked questions in connection with 
our effort to understand these executives’ own thinking about their journey to the top, their 
lived experiences in the corner office, and their advice to those who aspire to the position of 
CEO. Given our special interest in CEOs’ sensemaking, we asked them particularly about 
events (decision triggers) which were ambiguous, confusing and in some way violating CEOs’ 
or others’ expectations (see e.g., Maitlis & Christianson, 2014: 57). Our questioning addressed 
two aspects in particular: First, we wanted CEOs to focus especially on “toughest” decisions 
they have to make (with probes on how they make the decision and the effects it has on them 
personally). Two thirds of our interviewees referred to people decisions as their toughest 
decisions involving laying-off colleagues or shutting down a business and firing large numbers 
of employees. Essentially, such decisions fall into the category of violating expectations. 
Second, our questioning concentrated on how CEOs describe their feelings before making a 




sources of support are) and how CEOs prepare themselves for uncertainty and change (with 
probes on sources of insight and how they recognize situations where the established ways of 
thinking prove inadequate). In total, we collected 8,360 minutes of interview data with these 
leaders. The data encompassed numerous thick descriptions of CEO sensemaking and decision 
making in situations which seemed (at least initially) novel, ambiguous or confusing for CEOs. 
This wealth of data is explained by the fact that problems that make it up through the 
organization to the office of the CEO are usually non-routine and non-trivial. The CEOs 
frequently noted that only the thorniest problems landed on their desk, since easier decisions 
were dealt with lower down in the organization. Thus, the issues they face are ones that disturb 
the ‘taken-for-granted’ state of things, providing an ‘extreme case’ where sensemaking 
activities become more readily visible (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Bamberger & Pratt, 2010), similar 
to the high performance teams and crisis situations that have so often been the focus of previous 
sensemaking research (e.g. Weick, 1993). 
Data Analysis 
We used an inductive, open-ended approach to analyze our data (Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 
2013) and supported our analysis with NVivo qualitative data analysis software. Below we 
explain how we progressed across three different levels of increasing abstraction.  
The first-order analysis involves processing the raw data to identify an initial set of codes, and 
classifying in different groups the descriptions of those codes that the informants provided. It 
came to light that CEOs, when we asked them to describe the changing role of CEOs nowadays, 
consider their role as constituted by a continued sequence of sensemaking triggers. For 
example, one CEO said that his life could be described as an ongoing process of sensemaking 
as he permanently faces “a highly volatile environment” in which things are “very volatile and 
subject to change at very short notice” [051]. This was echoed also in another CEO’s response 
with regard to how she prepares herself for uncertainty: “I’m in a permanent state of un-




insight into several successive sub-phases covering the entire process of CEO sensemaking and 
decision-making in today’s dynamic and complex business world. At the end of this first stage 
of analysis, we had several first-order category codes at our disposal. 
We then started the subsequent step of second-order analysis. In order to move from the 
descriptive first-order insights toward more theoretical second-order themes, we further 
analyzed the data and studied the literature to support our analysis. We continuously iterated 
back and forth between data and literature, and gradually began to develop theory (Locke, 
2001). At periodic intervals, the authors cross-checked the data coding to ensure mutual 
understanding of the coding approach and emerging concepts. Working together as a research 
team, the authors regularly discussed the work-in-progress and the themes the data was 
yielding. Through reflexivity and the use of tools such as theoretical memoranda, the research 
questions were gradually elaborated, and the data sorted in new categories of meaning. Finally, 
we came up with several second-order themes. On the one hand, these themes informed about 
the different steps of the CEO sensemaking and decision-making process. On the other, they 
emphasized the interactionist character of this process and indicated the role of specific actors 
at a given point in time. 
On the highest level of analysis that leads to aggregate dimensions, we gradually processed 
additional data to identify how the key constructs of the analysis interacted. Specifically, we 
categorized raw data, linked categories to themes, and aggregated them into third-order 
dimensions. The result of this final step of analysis was three aggregate dimensions presenting 
the three main phases of CEO sensemaking and decision-making. Comparing these phases 
again with the interview data allowed us to additionally validate them. On the basis of this 
validation, we concluded that the analysis had reached the point of “category saturation” and 
that there was no need to collect further data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  
Table 1 provides a graphic representation of our inductive reasoning process and shows how 




dimensions) that reflect the main phases characterizing the interaction between the CEO and 
others in CEOs sensemaking and decision-making which we will subsequently develop. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
FINDINGS 
Our data suggested three main phases characterizing the interaction between a CEO and others. 
Each phase encompasses several successive sub-phases. Our findings thus provide a systematic 
insight into how CEOs’ interaction with others influences their sensemaking during C-suite 
decision-making. To facilitate comparisons between interview statements, we used anonymized 
interview identifiers to code direct CEO quotes (numeric identifier-region-sector).   
Collection 
In the ‘Collection’ phase, the CEO tries to source as much information as possible. During this 
phase, the CEO seeks information to make better sense of the situation. This information 
seeking often happens both internally and externally to the organization to get unfiltered views. 
The Collection phase is, by far, not cognitive alone. Instead CEOs appear to purposefully 
engage in interactions that allow them to “experience” information rather than simply collect 
it, subsequently translate this information into meaning and then enact on the basis of their 
sensemaking. In fact, we found that the key drivers of this phase are as much cognitive as they 
are experiential. The collection phase encompasses three different activities.  
CEO demands sense inside/outside the organization (Phase I). CEOs seek information 
(sensedemanding) via social interactions and personal reflection from travelling, conversations, 
observation and reading. Sensedemanding is thereby understood as CEOs’ engagement in a 
variety of strenuous efforts to seek and gather good information on which they then may base 
their decisions. Our analysis led us to identify three aspects of CEOs’ sensedemanding.  
The first aspect is sourcing information. One CEO explains this activity aimed at getting as 




Depending on the situations, trying to document myself more, trying to deepen the knowledge 
in various ways, and (…) pose a lot of questions to people who can give some contribution 
even when I still don’t have all the information yet. Because often by giving only a part of the 
information I try to extract what seems to be part of the answer. (140 EUR Industrial) 
This quote illustrates the CEO’s efforts to obtain sufficient information and the related 
systematic documentation of previously gathered information. Asking different people 
questions helps a CEO to collect particular knowledge and fill any knowledge gaps. Finally, 
combining the individual knowledge components with a simultaneous addition of newly 
collected information may help incrementally gain enough knowledge about a global issue.  
The second aspect is sensing the nuances of the environment: One CEOs explains this 
experiential way of collecting information as follows: 
And the risk is when you have a company that is big and powerful as (…) we are, you can 
lean it and it will lean. And so you’ve got to always be thinking about how it fits together and 
(…) if a consumer-led recession occurred (…), if a global crisis occurred, (…) if oil prices 
dropped a lot, how would you survive that? (168 NA Finance) 
The CEO’s statement illustrates the importance of taking into account the nuances of the 
environment as, for instance, a global economic crisis or an oil crisis leading to an immediate 
drop in oil price. More precisely, the CEO brings risk considerations to the fore so as to 
illuminate the importance of anticipating different environmental expectations. Adequately 
sensing these nuances and the associated potential risks stemming from the environment is 
highly relevant since this activity allows a CEO to make the right decisions. 
The third aspect is about getting insight into unfiltered views. One CEOs explains this 
information-seeking activity as follows: 
And I’m talking competitive edge, (…) to produce a better product for less money using 
technology. (…) This morning I met with fifteen new joiners, some of them technology, some 
of them marketing, some of them finance, asking them ‘what’s new’. If they’re recently out of 
school, if they’ve been working somewhere else, you know, what’s your experience, what’s 
new, how are you using technology differently than we might.” (015 EUR Services) 
By the example of technology and product innovation, the CEO illuminates the importance of 
getting insights into unfiltered views. This type of views expects the CEO to gain for example 




elaborate on how important access to such views is. First, these exchanges take place regularly 
and frequently. Given a CEO’s busy schedule, the regularity and frequency indicate their 
importance. Second, the CEO emphasizes their relevance for the competitiveness of the 
company as a whole and for the development of competitive products in particular.  
Others give sense to CEO. At this point, various actors are trying to influence a CEO’s 
sensemaking, whereas the CEO does not seem to be averse to such influence attempts. We 
identified three aspects clarifying how CEOs invite sensegiving by external and internal actors.  
The first aspect is that external stakeholders provide informative support. One CEO explains: 
We’ve had difficulty with our [COUNTRY] business this year and we’ve been implanting a 
major turnaround. There you have to have the wisdom to go and find support and advice. (...) 
So it’s being prepared to actually say I don’t know, and then being prepared to reach in and 
find out who’s had those experiences and try and learn from them.” (006 EUR Consumer) 
By the example of a major turnaround the CEO explicates how important it was to draw on 
people who made similar experiences. The CEO is thereby actively looking for people who are 
better acquainted with the situation of a corporate turnaround, is actively seeking advice from 
them and gladly adopts their views on what to do in this situation. Especially since the CEO 
has never experienced such a situation before, the information provided by external 
stakeholders importantly influences CEO’s thinking and interpretation of this specific situation.  
The second aspect is that personal, family and private life influences CEO. One CEO explains 
this type of influences as follows: 
It’s that network, it’s family. I think family is very important in that as well. There’s nothing 
like a very good other half to reveal some of your stupid thoughts. (…) - and you also read a 
lot as well, (…) but it’s mainly the network (…)” (006 EUR Consumer) 
This quote illuminates how relevant it is for a CEO to be able to draw on a family and private 
network. The influence of such a network is shown by the fact that the CEO can put own ideas 
up for discussion in a casual way and that, for example, a spouse even tells the CEO when an 
idea is just bad. Hence, a CEO invites close friends and family members to think along and is 




The third aspect is that actors from within the organization advise CEO. One CEO explains this 
type of influences as follows: 
[H]ow does the CEO make those decisions? (…) he has to be sure that he has the right staff 
that provides him with the data (…) Well for instance, (…) just thinking of Elizabeth, she’s 
the investment relations manager. So she is a part of the decision support system, if I have to 
make any decision with regard to (…) investors’ relations (…). (016 APAC Tech) 
The CEO emphasizes the relevance of actors within the company who support a CEO’s decision 
making. The example of the investor relations manager further elucidates how relevant such an 
internal actor is for the CEO’s investment decisions. Such a manager provides the CEO with 
the necessary data on the basis of which the CEO can then make decisions in connection with 
any issues relating to the investors.  
CEO makes sense of the context (Phase I). At the end of the ‘Collection’ phase, the CEO tries 
to make sense of the previously collected information about their context. We identified four 
aspects clarifying and influencing the way CEOs make sense of their contexts.  
The first aspect is that biographical background influences CEO. One CEO explains the 
importance of such background as follows:  
You can go back to the early childhood years and reflect on figures that were around you (…) 
that gave you a very solid grounding with respect to your values and beliefs and the way they 
behaved. So, very early role models with respect to (…) just base behaviors in the way that 
you deal with other humans and you go about your business. (001 APAC Industrial) 
The statement above explains the importance of a CEO’s biographical background and in 
particular the way childhood years influence personal values and beliefs and ideas about how 
to behave adequately. More specifically, biographical background strongly affects a person’s 
character because a CEO refers to old roles models, and the values which they have always 
embodied and lived up to, both in everyday actions and in the business everyday life. 
The second aspect is retrospective rationalizing. One CEO explains the activity of ascribing 
some meaning to a decision in retrospect as follows:  
(..) he was a good guy and he’s not here anymore and I altered his career trajectory. (…) I 
really think that I gave him every opportunity to choose to stay here in a different role and I 
think he would have been successful at it, and he said he didn’t want it and we treated him 




The quote illuminates how the CEO retrospectively rationalizes the firing of a senior manager 
and the associated influence on the senior manager’s career. In the specific case here, such 
rationalization takes place with regard to fairness towards both the individual and the 
organization. First, the CEO draws attention to the alternative career opportunities that were 
presented to the person, but the manager did not want to go into these in turn. The CEO thus 
judges the behavior to be fair towards the person. Second, the CEO illuminates that the position 
had to be filled due to business reasons. The CEO thus feels that the decision made was equally 
fair in relation to the organization too.  
The third aspect is seeking solutions. One CEO explains how this activity is done:  
Exactly that, reflection, i.e., to have a good understanding of the consequences of the various 
alternatives and assess them and then make a choice about what is the point of equilibrium… 
and there is a great variety of decisions. (143 EUR Tech) 
This quote explains the seeking of solutions through reflection. More specifically, it is about 
reflecting on the consequences, their corresponding alternatives and the associated variety of 
decisions. According to the CEO, the systematic examination of the possible decisions and the 
possible alternatives resulting from them finally allows to determine the best suitable decision.  
The fourth aspect is intuition as a moderator. One CEO explains the functioning of intuition in 
connection with the CEO’s efforts to make sense of a specific situation as follows:  
(…) intuition I think is a wonderful, wonderful thing. (…) And we meet our clients and just 
sometimes there’s something that tells you that it’s not the right place to be. (…) not because 
they’re corrupt or bad people, it’s just because they’re looking at a different thing. But that’s 
with intuition, because I have nothing to select it, (…), they are not from Chile, they have a 
clean record in their countries, but there’s something that tells me that our relationship is not 
going to work. (013 NA Services) 
The CEO explains the general importance of intuition and then further elaborates on its role in 
case of selecting the right clients. Interestingly, intuition seems to be particularly useful in cases 
where the information about a particular client is very low. In such a scenario, the intuitive 
feeling guides the CEO in deciding not to enter into a particular business relationship. 




The ‘Consultation & contestation’ phase is highly political. In this phase, we observed 
sensebreaking, equivocality and power-breaking (between the CEO and the team). While the 
CEO seeks advice and tries to make sense of the complexities associated with the decision, 
he/she is simultaneously being challenged and also challenges and gives sense to the team.  
CEO demands sense from TMT (Phase II). CEOs often talked about actively selecting 
members in their team that would have different views from their own. They also discussed 
about actively encouraging others to dissent, to speak up and challenge the CEO’s view. We 
identified two aspects clarifying how CEOs invite dissension from their team members. The 
first aspect is communicating and collecting feedback from the team, described as follows:  
I guess you have to have a team that you feel comfortable having discussions with along that 
sort of nature, so honest and open discussions and getting feedback, you know, two-way 
dialogue, two-way feedback around that, but ultimately you’ve got to make the decision, 
nobody’s going to make the decision for you. (105 EUR Finance) 
The CEO’s statement illuminates the importance of communicating and collecting feedback 
from the team by highlighting the relevance of having a close and intense two-way dialogue 
with the team. Trust and honesty are thereby the basic prerequisites for such a dialogue. To the 
extent that these conditions are met, such a dialogue allows a CEO to become quickly aware of 
the pros and cons associated with a potential decision. However, and as emphasized by the 
quote, the decision must finally be made by the CEO. 
The second aspect is seeking dissent. One CEO illustrates the way of actively encouraging 
others to dissent as follows:  
(…) consulting with let’s say the core team around you, (…) try to involve as many different 
points of view as well and also deliberately consulting with people who you expect to be going 
in a different direction than you think you will be going, sort of make sure that you have the 
devil’s advocate in the room. (...) Or the black hat or whatever technique you want to use for 
it. (086 MENA Consumer) 
By drawing on the techniques of the “Devil’s Advocate” and the “black hat”, the CEO explains 
the importance of seeking dissent. Hence, this means that it is very important to be surrounded 




different way. The CEO always keeps these people close to him, always approaches them 
actively and asks them for their personal opinions on a specific topic. 
TMT breaks sense toward CEO. After CEO’s invitation for feedback and dissent, the team 
takes this into effect and proceeds with sensebreaking, thereby essentially engaging in the 
destruction of what the CEO has previously made sense of. We identified two aspects that 
further explicate how team members break sense. 
The first aspect relates to when the team cognitively challenges CEO assumptions. One CEO 
illustrates the way in which the team engages in such an activity as follows:  
[O]ne of the most important things is having people around you that tell you how wrong you 
are. And I have luckily a group of people that are incredibly smart, incredibly good at what 
they do and generally – I say generally, not always – but generally unafraid to tell me that 
I’m completely kooky or thinking about things the wrong way. (019-NA Services) 
The quote explains how relevant it is to have a team that intellectually challenges the CEO and 
his/her assumptions. Specifically, it is really important to have team members who are, on the 
one hand, experts in a certain area and on the other, openly point out where the CEO is wrong.  
In addition to the cognitive dimension, there is a second aspect labelled as emotional support 
from the team. One CEO explains how the team provides such type of support:  
I have a tremendous relationship with my team and with my people, never is as perfect as you 
would like it but you will always try to get as close to perfection as you can and that will be 
a tremendous source of support. (133 MENA Industrial) 
The CEO explains how critical it is to have a good interpersonal relationship with the different 
members of the team. It is this type of relationship that provides a CEO with critical support. 
TMT gives sense toward CEO. After breaking CEO’s sense, the team gives sense to a CEO. 
Two aspects further explain how the team actively influences CEO’s sensemaking. The first 
aspect relates to the circumstance that the team and colleagues advise the CEO: 
Some of the toughest spaces over the last ten years have been in agriculture, (…) but our MD 
and myself are very close and we help each other. So at times when he makes an odd move 
or is feeling pressure and emotions, we’ve been both threatened to be locked up in the country 
by Ministers on the front pages, so it’s not like a simple conversation. He and I help each 




The quote illustrates that the CEO is open to advice from the team and colleagues and the 
managing director (MD) in particular. In extreme and turbulent situations, the CEO is 
frequently looking for advice and help from the managing director. The CEO and the managing 
director have already gone through a lot together and mastered difficult situations as the one 
described. Due to this close relationship, the MD influences the CEO accordingly.  
The second aspect is about when team and colleagues suggest how a CEO may think and act. 
One CEO explains how those actors advise a CEO as follows: 
[W]hat I typically do is get a senior person (…) He’s been in the firm for a lot longer than I 
have and is a wise guy and (…) he’ll be very blunt with me and he also understands the 
nuances of what’s going on because he’s worked with a lot of CEOs. So I find that process 
very helpful and (…) you learn, you know: So I’m going to do this faster. (020 NA Services) 
The above quote illustrates the way team and colleagues suggest how a CEO may think and act. 
More specifically, the CEO draws on the advice of a senior person who has worked with a lot 
of other CEOs before. The senior person indicates how the CEO may deal with certain situations 
and challenges and this facilitates a faster learning curve for the CEO. In fact, the senior 
person’s advice seems to strongly influence both the CEO’s actions and thinking. 
CEO makes sense of own prior decisions (Phase II). While a CEO has made sense at the end 
of the collection phase (Phase I), we identified four other aspects indicating a later point of 
renewed sensemaking aimed at evaluating a CEO’s prior decisions. 
The first aspect refers to the circumstance that a CEO needs to refresh understanding & develop 
new ideas. One CEO explains those two related activities as follows: 
(…) if you have a good team, those decisions are easier (…) (a) because you've got a good 
team and they have different skills and experiences, (b) you tend to come up with things you 
haven’t thought of. (…) And so when I’m thinking when I have a difficult decision, it’s how 
soon can I pull the team together to really talk through this. (123 NA Finance) 
The CEO clearly depicts the role of a good team in order to meet the challenge that a CEO 
needs to refresh understanding and develop new ideas. More specifically, drawing on a team 
firstly allows to access different skills and experiences and secondly provides a breeding ground 




end of the quote when indicating that in the event of an immediately difficult decision situation, 
the ultimate goal is to bring the team together as quickly as possible. 
The second aspect of a CEO’s renewed sensemaking connects to the fact that a CEO asks for 
validation. One CEO elucidates this activity as follows: 
But I surely do consult a lot and my style of management is collaborative enough that I have 
a senior team now which I’ve created this year (…). The five of us sit down every week and 
we go through all of the weekly wins and concerns from the different groups of the company. 
And so, taking on that feedback, that, sort of, three sixty degree, we’re getting an idea of 
where the concerns are. (110 MENA Services) 
The quote explains how a CEO refers to the senior management team for validation. In fact, 
there is a weekly meeting in place with a 360 degrees feedback where the CEO gets input from 
four other management team members. In these regular consultations, all weekly problems and 
successes are systematically discussed and jointly analyzed. Such meetings thus offer the 
appropriate environment for a CEO to determine corresponding validation.  
The third aspect revolves around the circumstance that a CEO is making use of doubt. One CEO 
elucidates the importance of doubt as follows: 
I open up myself (…) and if they perceive doubts, that does not bother me. I also have no 
problems in telling people I am convinced on something, even if I am not that convinced. I 
share a lot with them, and I think they are my sounding board. (121 LATAM Consumer) 
The quote emphasizes how the CEO is making use of doubt. While the CEO openly expresses 
doubt to others, the CEO also sometimes conceals doubts. In the case of the first use of doubt, 
the CEO may stimulate people to openly provide their feedback and on this basis then evaluate 
previous or prospectively anticipated ways of thinking and acting. The latter is probably used 
in the case of ideas that the CEO may still have a few doubts about. Validation in this sense is 
equated with the non-opposing on the part of a third party. In a nutshell, the usability of doubt 
seems to find different and context-specific application forms.   
The fourth aspect concerns the point that a CEO tests ideas by asking questions. One CEO 
elucidates the importance of asking questions as follows: 
[I]t goes back to listening to stakeholders or other observers of the industry, so you don’t get 




internal change to see whether actually what people are saying to you is on target. Are they 
just telling you what they think you want to know? (022 EUR Industrial) 
The quote illuminates how a CEO tests ideas by asking questions. Testing ideas by asking 
questions helps the CEO in this endeavor for the following two reasons, among others. First, 
systematically and repeatedly asking questions seems highly relevant since it allows the CEO 
to investigate whether people are telling what they actually think. Secondly and building upon 
it, repeated enquiries allow a CEO to get closer to the detection of organizational reality. 
However, as indicated at the beginning of the quote, asking questions to different actors is 
helpful because it allows the testing of ideas that go beyond one’s own nose. 
Consolidation and Consensus 
The ‘Consolidation & consensus’ phase is where sensemaking of the decision is finalized and 
sensegiving by the CEO to the team and other stakeholders happens so as to achieve consensus, 
buy-in and/or legitimacy. This is the final phase of the sensemaking-to-decision making process 
that the CEO goes through. The prevalent aspect of this phase is that of communicating the 
outcome to the team and more broadly to those implementing the decision and then securing 
organizational buy-in. At this phase, sensemaking and sensegiving are reversed with the CEO 
doing most of the sensegiving and the organization the sensemaking. 
CEO gives sense of decision to TMT. Having re-calibrated sensemaking at the end of the 
‘Consultation & contestation’ phase, the CEO gives sense of their independent decision to the 
team. We identified two aspects clarifying how CEOs give sense to their team members. 
The first aspect relates to CEOs’ engagement in creating legitimacy and consensus to achieve 
stakeholder buy-in. One CEO describes this engagement as follows: 
Of course the proper analysis, that is a given but the main thing, I would say that if you stand 
face to face to people, they definitely do accept also tough news. If you take the responsibility, 
then your chances of getting (…) I wouldn’t say understanding but at least acceptance of the 
decision, that you stand a pretty good chance there. (086 MENA Consumer) 
In this statement, the CEO explains the importance of combining a systematic analysis of a 




the creation of legitimacy and consensus and the achievement of stakeholder buy-in. The CEO 
thereby particularly illuminates how face-to-face communication allows to create acceptance 
even in cases that are about convincingly conveying negative content. 
The second aspect relates to the need to share responsibility. One CEO explains the importance 
of joint responsibility as follows: 
Depending on what the issue is, I’ll definitely engage far and wide. I’m one that talks a lot 
about those big decisions, (…) and there’s got to be trust obviously, but I don’t make decisions 
by myself. I don’t put myself into a cave on those. (053 APAC Services) 
This interview excerpt depicts the need to share responsibility in case of pending important and 
great decisions. In order to achieve shared responsibility in such cases, the CEO engages with 
different actors in the near and far environment and talks a lot about the decision-making 
process, aimed at getting more people on board. 
CEO gives sense to organization. At the end of the ‘Consolidation & consensus’ phase, the 
CEO gives sense of the processed information and associated decisions to the organization. We 
identified three aspects clarifying how CEOs give sense of decision to their organizations. 
The first aspect concerns the circumstance that a CEO is communicating to others. One CEO 
describes this way of communication as follows: 
Where you want to go and communicate and then execute. And of that, I believe the 
communication is the most important part, (…) I think 80% of the game is (…) the ability to 
communicate, the ability to attract people, the ability to convince and get their commitment 
towards the change. (...) [Y]ou need passion, you need the patience to really communicate 
with thousands … tens of thousands of people. (115 APAC Consumer) 
This quote emphasizes how critical communication is for the CEO. In fact, the CEO mentions 
that “eighty percent of the game is communication”. Winning people over and getting them to 
execute an idea only works through communication.  
The second aspect is associated with the fact that CEOs are engaging and inspiring others. One 
CEO explains such activities as follows: 
So easy to say, difficult to do, (…) how do you communicate and convince the people - and 
that’s in our case, you know, twenty-four thousand. It’s not a small number. (…) How do you 




the right direction, set the right strategy and mobilize and convince them to follow your lead, 
that’s what’s needed. (066-APAC Services) 
The quote illuminates the circumstance that a CEOs needs to be capable of engaging and 
inspiring others. As suggested by the quote, a CEO thereby may mobilize others by clearly 
defining the direction and showing a convincing strategy for implementation. 
The third aspect concerns sensehiding. One CEO explains how this is done as follows: 
But managing that and getting people to do certain things, fully knowing upfront that once 
they’ve done it, that’s the end of their shelf life and they will be replaced. Those things are 
tough because you can’t give people the full picture, then they won’t do it. (101 AFR Finance) 
The CEO clearly mentions that sensehiding is an important aspect of managing and getting 
people to do something. More specifically, withholding that some staff members will be later 
replaced provides the necessary foundation to initially motivate them, since they would never 
voluntarily do so, had the known the full implications. 
DISCUSSION 
We found three main phases characterizing the interaction between a CEO and the others that 
influence CEO sensemaking and decision-making. The first phase “Collection” encompasses 
three successive sub-phases: (1) ‘CEO demands sense inside/outside the organization (Phase 
I)’ is characterized by a CEO actively seeking exposure to cues within and outside the 
organization regarding the sought-after information. Subsequently, the environment gives sense 
to the CEO which we labelled as (2) ‘Others give sense to CEO’. Then, a (3) ‘CEO makes sense 
of the context’ (Phase I). The latter is often, but not always, moderated by a CEO’s intuition.  
The second phase “Consultation & contestation” consists of four sub-phases: With the intention 
to continue to seek more information and/or test previous sensemaking, a (4) ‘CEO demands 
sense from TMT (Phase II)’ aimed at challenging the CEO’s view and/or providing different 
perspectives. At this point, the CEO thus voluntarily, temporarily and nominally concedes some 
of the position-specific power by allowing equivocality, meaning the simultaneous existence of 
several interpretations by members of the TMT. Subsequently, there is (5) ‘TMT beaks sense 




On this basis, there is (6) ‘TMT gives sense toward CEO’, leading to CEO’s new sensemaking 
(i.e. second sensemaking phase for the CEO) which is basically characterized by a situation in 
which (7) a ‘CEO makes sense of own prior decisions (Phase II)’. In the case of the latter, the 
CEO engages among other things in testing prior decisions (e.g. by collecting as many views 
as possible, via expert advice or by trying to identify blind spots) and seeking to validate prior 
sensemaking (validation can be just a formality or the CEO really feels the need for validation 
by others or looks for sounding boards to test own sensemaking).  
The third phase “Consolidation & consensus” is composed of two sub-phases, both illustrating 
that a CEO retracts the power that has been previously voluntarily conceded and brings back 
univocality (i.e. CEO’s voice only): With such re-calibrated sensemaking, the (8) ‘CEO gives 
sense of decision to TMT’. Next, the (9) ‘CEO gives sense to organization’ of the processed 
information and associated decisions. This may require filtering information (sensehiding) for 
political or practical reasons. Figure 1 provides an overview of the different phases and sub-
phases of the CEO-TMT interaction. We will now discuss how our framework adds to research. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
CEO and Others - the Interaction  
The model we propose allows us to capture the CEOs’ interactions with others and 
predominantly with the TMT in the process of decision-making. We have been able to unpack 
the dynamics of this interaction and show how the decision-making process is characterized by 
the oscillation between the CEO and others. Unlike traditional approaches to decision-making 
assuming a predominantly top-down process (Cyert & March, 1963), we found this to be quite 
removed from what actually happens within and outside the boardroom. Although in each of 
the three phases identified the interaction is initiated by the CEO, the information flow and 
exchange is such that the CEO often gives power and voice away to others to later take it back 
once each stage has matured allowing to move the process further. In the first phase of 




& Contestation, the interaction is more contained between the CEO and the TMT with the 
limited support of selected others (occasionally external to the TMT or even the organization) 
as sources of validation or sounding boards. In other words, the net of interactions is smaller as 
decision-making moves from the first to the second phase. In the last phase of Consolidation & 
Consensus, the interaction is one-sided in that the CEO communicates the results of decision-
making process to the TMT and the organization. 
The interactions between CEOs and the TMT has been the subject of research particularly over 
the last 15 years (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Peterson, Martorana, Smith & Owens, 2003; 
Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick, 2007; Ling, Simsek, Lubatkin and Veiga, 2008; 
Gerstner, König, Enders & Hambrick 2013; Ou et al., 2014;  Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017; Ma 
& Seidl, 2018), ranging from exploration of the effects of CEO personality (e.g. Peterson, 1997; 
Ou et al., 2014) and to the impact of such interactions on organizational performance (Ling et 
al., 2008; Peterson et al., 2003). Often research has treated this CEO-TMT interaction as a unit, 
rather dissecting how the dynamics of such interaction unfold (Peterson, Martorana, Smith & 
Owens, 2003). Moreover, even when such interactions are examined in more recent studies, 
they tend to present this interaction, not really as “inter”-action, but rather as mono-action or 
mono-direction, in the sense that the action starts from one actor (i.e. the CEO) and stops at 
another or others (i.e. the TMT). Our study indicates that the interaction is much more dynamic, 
manifesting itself as a pendular exchange of power and voice between the CEO and others. The 
emergence of multivocality and (as a result) also equi-vocality democratizes decision-making. 
As Sonenshein (2007: 1027) notes, “[o]rganizational life is often equivocal and uncertain, and 
the very construction of a particular issue reflects (at least in part) each individual’s expectations 
and motivations.” For a CEO to allow these multiple expectations and motivations to unfold 
and be expressed, requires letting go of control, or put more simply, become less directive and 




have previously created an environment of “psychological safety” (Edmondson, 1999) that 
allowed this multivocality and the ensuing equivocality to take place – in the first place. 
 The process resembles less that of an orchestra with the CEO being the conductor and more 
like a CEO-controlled theatrical improvisation. In other words, while the CEO controls how 
decision-making plays out and when voice and power is given and retracted, the information 
flow and what insights emerge from the decision-making discussions are unscripted. The choice 
of TMT members and how the interaction with them plays out will vary depending on CEO 
personality (Peterson, Martorana, Smith & Owens, 2003), CEO needs (Ma & Seidl, 2018) and 
the context within which decision-making takes place (Jianhong & Nadkarni, 2017). 
Interestingly, we found that the TMT is not the only source of insight or validation or sounding 
board for the CEO. CEOs selectively engaged in their interactions, where needed, but in a rather 
controlled way, and also insights from individuals that are external to the organization such as 
family members and other trusted personal advisors within and outside the organization. The 
influence of these parties is more in line with CEOs’ attempts to maintain an open mind that 
would ultimately allow them to make more informed decisions.  
CEO Decision-Making 
Our CEO sensemaking-to-decision-making model unpacks the dynamic interplay between 
rationality and intuition. The model’s successive steps inform on when and why the one or the 
other dominates accordingly. In the Collection phase, the third step in which a CEO initially 
makes sense of the context reflects CEO’s oscillation between retrospective rationalizing and 
applying intuition as a moderator. In the Consultation & contestation phase, the fifth step in 
which the team engages in sensebreaking toward a CEO similarly depicts the dynamic 
rationality-intuition interplay. On the one hand, the team intellectually challenges a CEO’s 
assumptions, while also providing to the CEO emotional or other support.  
Our model further reduces the gap between two academic discussions on making judgements 




Rationalist-cognitive approaches emphasize that decision-making relates to information 
processing, calculation and rationalizing. Rationalist-cognitive approaches build on the 
assumption that actors confronted with difficult moral decision situations make logical 
calculations and draw on cognitive philosophical principles (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969). Others shift 
from highlighting the role of rationalization to highlighting the role of intuition (e.g., Haidt, 
2003; Sonenshein, 2007). This shift is part of a broader trend towards recognising that thinking 
is often an automatic, quick and emotional process (Kahneman, 2011).  However, more recent 
research suggests that both intuitions and rationalization matter in the context of groups. Haidt 
(2012, p. 55) shows that others “can do for us what we cannot do for ourselves: they can 
challenge us, giving us reasons and arguments […] that sometimes trigger new intuitions”. 
Social interactions are characterized by a rationality-intuition interplay as “providing logically 
compelling arguments” involves “triggering new […] intuitions in the listener” (Haidt, 2001, 
p. 818). Our model further unpacks the rationality-intuition interplay in the context of CEOs’ 
judgement and decision making in complex situations as, for instance, when CEOs have to 
decide on dismissals with potentially drastic implications for the persons affected: In the 
collection phase, for example, intuitions moderate a CEO’s retrospective rationalizing, and, in 
the consultation & contestation phase, the team cognitively challenges CEO assumptions while 
providing emotional support for the CEO. 
Our work further develops previous social intuitionists models (Haidt, 2001; Sonenshein, 
2007). Haidt’s (2001) ‘social intuitionist model of moral judgment’ suggests that intuitions have 
a much stronger influence than rational deliberation does. Haidt (2001) thereby builds on two 
fundamental assumptions. Firstly, the model downplays the private aspect of rational reasoning 
and instead emphasizes its social dimension. Secondly, Haidt (2001) suggests that rational 
reasoning is generally the result of intuitions. Consequently, rationalizing does not cause 
decision-making, but instead takes place normally after a decision has been made. Our model 




social dimension unfolds. Firstly, our focus on the interaction between CEOs and others helps 
us to systematically work out the social aspect of CEO’s sensemaking and decision-making. 
Unlike Haidt’s (2001) theoretical model, we draw on empirical evidence to develop a model 
that clearly shows when and why the CEO or others (i.e. the TMT) are involved at different 
stages of decision-making, and thereby details the chronological order of the dynamic 
interactions between the different actors involved. Secondly, we show that intuition and 
rationalization do not take place along a linear process, but rather via a circular and dynamic 
process. The various steps and phases of our model capture the permanent oscillation between 
a CEO’s intuition and rationalizing in difficult decision-making situations.  
Sensemaking 
Our model allows us to unpack how the interaction dynamics between CEOs and others (i.e. 
TMT members) influence sensemaking in CEO’s decision-making. Due to limited access to the 
upper echelons of organizations (Kakabadse et al., 2015; Thomas, 1993), CEO sensemaking 
remains still an area of unchartered waters for researchers in the field. There is a dearth of 
research on cognition at the CEO level and thus little is still known about how the CEO-TMT 
interface cognitively influences CEO sensemaking (Bromiley & Rau, 2016). Our study has 
allowed to unpack the interaction dynamics between the CEO and others as they individually 
and collectively engage in meaning-making. These dynamics are captured in our sensemaking-
to-decision-making model which showcases how power is performatively traded in the 
boardroom when the CEO invites and revokes multivocality and how CEOs experience 
sensedemanding, sensemaking, sensegiving and sensehiding in C-suite decision-making. 
Power has remained relatively unexplored within the sensemaking research and several scholars 
have called for more studies that explore the links between the two (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015: 
23; Balogun et al., 2014: 192; Brown et al., 2015). Our study has provided real-life evidence of 
how sensemaking “is both an effect, and productive, of what are continuously negotiated 




model explains power-breaking (between the CEO and the team) where CEOs allow 
sensebreaking to happen by giving power to the TMT to dissent. The interesting aspect here is 
how on the one hand multivocality and the ensuing equivocality is encouraged by the CEO but 
on the other hand, this is controlled by the CEO so that there is no mutiny in the ranks. This is 
because multivocality is performative rather than actual. This means that a CEO’s call for 
dissension leads to multivocality and equivocality, but such dissension is contained to the 
purpose of resolving the task at hand rather than being an invitation for dissension to power. 
Hence, the retraction of power and ensuing ownership of decision-making by the CEO is 
safeguarded. Sensemaking is dependent on language, talk and communication (Balogun et al., 
2014) and this becomes the basis for the trading of univocality to multivocality in the 
boardroom, hence opening the ground for equivocality to manifest. The fostering of discussions 
that “celebrate multiple perspectives” compared to “suppression of opposing viewpoints” can 
help organizations’ sensemaking capacity (Sonenshein, 2007: 1037). The role of discourse in 
sensemaking has been largely underexplored, despite its acknowledged performative power 
(Balogun et al., 2014). While Balogun et al. (2014: 189) suggest that the intentional use of 
discursive practices reinforces hegemonic positions in strategic conversations, our data showed 
that the exact opposite also holds true. Under specific contexts, strategic actors (CEO) 
intentionally use discursive practices to concede hegemony (TMT) for the purpose of their own 
sensemaking and to achieve better quality of decision-making. In other words, each member –  
CEO and team- ‘enact’ a role – they do not ‘become’ the role.  
A further aspect emerging from our study is the interplay between individual and collective 
sensemaking in the C-suite. Ou et al. (2014) suggest that CEOs can form collective meanings 
in a way that transcends hierarchical levels and affects the attitudes and behaviors of employees 
at all organizational levels. We found that the interaction dynamics between a CEO and others 
with a view to produce collective meaning and to reach a decision is far from linear and shaped 




captures the individual dimension (i.e. sensemaking within individuals) and the social 
dimension of sensemaking (i.e. between individuals). Sensemaking can happen either within 
individuals, involving collective meaning-making (where individuals advocate for their view 
and engage in influence tactics to shape others’ understandings) or between individuals where 
“intersubjective meaning is constructed through a more mutually co-constituted process” where 
“members jointly engage with an issue and build their understanding of it together” (Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014: 78). In the context of CEO decision-making, we found that sensemaking 
happens interchangeably between these two modes. It happens ‘within individuals’, by means 
of multivocality (advocacy of views) and the creation of conversation space where CEOs have 
their views challenged, hence, nominally giving away some of their power to develop better 
quality of sensemaking in return. However, it also happens ‘between individuals’ as meaning 
is co-created between the CEO and his/her team. Essentially, the decision-making process 
involves oscillation within and between individuals engaging in four types of sense processes: 
sensemaking, sensegiving, sensebreaking and sensehiding.  
Finally, our model provides new insights into sensedemanding, one aspect of the sensemaking 
process that has so far been underplayed and understudied. We found two different patterns of 
sensedemanding. The first is straightforward and involves the CEO gathering information 
during the ‘Consultation’ phase. There, sensedemanding directly triggers sensegiving. This 
pattern reflects what we already know as sensedemanding according to the literature. Via 
sensedemanding individuals try to improve the quality of the information upon which they 
reach a decision and reduce the level of uncertainty (Vlaar et al., 2008: 240; see also Weick, 
1969: 40). The second pattern – observed in the ‘Consultation & Contestation’ phase – is more 
complicated. In this phase, sensedemanding is manifested when the CEO invites dissent. There, 
a more complicated loop is observed whereby the sensedemanding-sensegiving process is 
mediated by sensebreaking. So in that phase, sensegiving is not produced by building new 




sensebreaking. The distinction between these two patterns helps us understand how the way in 
which sensedemanding takes place (i.e. asking for more information vs. asking to be 
challenged) defines the format and nature of sensegiving and as a result how new insights are 
generated. With sensedemanding being one of the less researched constructs in the sensemaking 
literature our study invites future research that unpacks further these different patterns. 
Conclusions 
Our study unfolded the dynamics of sensemaking as the product of interactions between the 
CEO and others, as the struggle between intuition and rationality and as the interplay of 
sensemaking, sensegiving, sensedemanding and – to some extent – sensehiding. Via our CEO 
sensemaking-to-decision-making model we showcased the systemic (Weick et al, 2005) and 
social nature of sensemaking (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). We call for more studies on 
sensemaking and decision-making at TMT level, including studies that could unveil how power 
asymmetries may be used for the benefit of collective sensemaking - rather than at its expense. 
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